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ABSTRACT 
Why do Low R2 Hedge Funds have Low R2? An Empirical Study of the Performance and Risk 
of Low R2 Funds  
by 
Arnab Banerjee 
December 2017 
Chair: Vikas Agarwal 
Major Academic Unit: Finance 
In this study, I examine whether low R2 funds are exposed to higher equity systematic tail 
risk that is not accounted for in the existing multi-factor models used to evaluate hedge funds. 
With a parsimonious set of risk factors that includes systematic tail risk, I show that there is a 
significant increase (about 12%) in the R2 for funds in the lowest quintile of R2. In contrast, the 
increase in R2 for funds in the other quintiles of R2 is relatively modest (about 2%). Moreover, I 
show that the spreads between the future performance of low and high R2 funds narrows by 
about 9% after accounting for the systematic tail risk factor. I also show that 90% of the decrease 
in future performance spread is driven by accounting for tail risk in the low R2 funds. My results 
provide evidence that superior performance of low R2 funds may not be entirely attributable to 
higher managerial skill, and that systematic tail risk of such funds can partially explain why they 
perform well.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Hedge Funds, Correlation, Factor Models, Tail Risk.  
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I INTRODUCTION  
“Our results indicate that factor models fail to measure systematic risk in over one-third of funds 
in commercial databases. These zero- R2 funds appear to feature substantial exposure to an 
omitted systematic risk factor…” Bollen (2013) 
Finding talented hedge fund managers is a difficult task. Among other metrics, institutional 
investors look at past performance, fund characteristics and low correlation to the overall market 
to identify managers that have a better chance of outperforming in the future. In my paper, I 
provide new evidence that funds with low R2 values have greater equity systematic tail risk, 
suggesting the presence of an omitted factor in the model to estimate R2. 
The R2 (adjusted R-square) of a fund, derived from regressing a fund’s excess returns (in 
excess of the risk free rate) on a broad set of risk factors, tells us how closely the fund returns can 
be explained by the various risk factors. More precisely, R2 is a measure of the fraction of fund’s 
return variance that can be explained by the returns on the risk factors. Returns of the funds that 
follow unique investment strategies tend to be less correlated with the returns on systematic risk 
factors on an average, and hence have low R2 values. So investors favor low R2 funds over high 
R2 funds because the former have a better chance of outperforming the latter, reason being low R2 
is attributed to higher managerial skill.1  
My primary research question is: do funds with low R2 exhibit greater systematic tail risk? 
A related question that I address is: how much of the superior future performance of hedge funds 
with low R2 can be explained by their exposure to systematic tail risk? The academic literature 
                                                 
1 “Despite the challenges in performance measurement, the most interesting feature of hedge funds is that 
they are thought of as nearly pure “bets” on manager skill”, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Brown (1995) 
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examining the relation between fund R2 and future fund performance is quite extensive and rich. 
Titman and Tiu (2011, henceforth T-T) find that low R2 can be linked to managerial skill as the 
performance of low R2 funds is better than high R2 funds. They also find that R2 and fund fee have 
a negative correlation. They find that investors are ready to pay higher fees for low R2 funds that 
exhibit low correlation with systematic risk factors. Amihud and Goyenko (2013) show a similar 
result for mutual funds, i.e., selectivity as measured by (1-R2) is directly proportional to  future 
fund performance even after controlling for funds’ past performance, characteristics, and style. 
Several other studies that use measures similar to R2, document similar findings. According to 
Sun, Wang, and Zheng (2012), funds that have higher strategy distinctiveness, SDI tend to be low 
R2 funds, and they implement innovative strategies. In contrast, funds that have low SDI (high R2) 
follow common investing themes and are more likely to follow other funds (herding mentality). 
There is also evidence that active management as measured by difference in portfolio and 
benchmark composition (weights) has a positive effect on mutual fund performance as shown in 
Brands, Brown, and Gallagher (2006), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009), and Cremers et al. (2011).  
There can be many reasons behind funds having low R2 values. According to Sharpe 
(1992), style regression can attribute a manager’s returns to asset classes only if the fund returns 
are correlated to the asset class returns. Fung and Hsieh (1997) argue that Sharpe’s style regression 
is more suitable for buy and hold returns on asset classes and may not be appropriate for 
performance attribution in hedge funds. They attribute the low explanatory power of factor model 
regressions to the fact that hedge funds take positions in exotic securities that are not captured by 
traditional buy-and-hold risk factors.  Another reason being hedge funds employ dynamic 
strategies that are associated with high turnover. One way to improve explanatory power is to 
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construct factors that can capture the risks of different hedge fund trading strategies (see Fung and 
Hsieh (2001); Agarwal and Naik (2004); Duarte, Longstaff, and Yu (2007); Buraschi, Kosowski, 
and Trojani (2010); and Agarwal, Fung, Loon, and Naik (2011)). Another way to improve 
explanatory power of factor models is to allow factor exposures to vary over time to accommodate 
changes in hedge fund strategy as shown by Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai 
(2013).  
Despite the various attempts to improve the explanatory power of models for hedge funds, 
there remains a possibility that the existing models may be missing a systematic risk factor. 
According to Bollen (2013), one-third of the funds in a broad sample have R2 that is insignificantly 
different from zero. Moreover, he shows that zero R2 hedge funds still have systematic risk which 
is not being captured by the multifactor models possibly because of a missing factor. T-T observe 
that the variance in the returns of a portfolio of low R2 funds cannot be explained by the set of 
common factors shown to be important in the prior hedge fund literature. They find that though 
the returns of low R2 funds don’t correlate highly with the returns of the common factors, they do 
show high correlation amongst themselves. They acknowledge the possibility of missing factors: 
“this observation is consistent with the presence of additional common factors to which the hedge 
funds tend to be exposed.”  
Motivated by these observations, I address the following questions in my study. First, is 
there greater systematic tail risk in low R2 funds that can partially explain why they may perform 
better in the future?  In other words, are the results from T-T driven by failure to account for greater 
systematic tail risk of funds with low R2? Can a systematic tail risk factor help explain the 
difference between the future performance of low R2 funds and high R2 funds? 
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What is unique about systematic tail risk factor that is not captured by standard hedge fund 
factor models? Systematic tail risk factor provides a measure that tells us how susceptible the fund 
is to extreme downturns in the market. In other words, does the fund experience drawdowns that 
coincide with market drawdowns, and how severe the drawdowns are when compared to those of 
the market. Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016) propose a new measure of systematic tail risk 
that can explain future hedge fund performance. This is consistent with the findings of Bali, Brown, 
and Caglayan (2012) who provide evidence that the main driver of fund performance is systematic 
risk and not idiosyncratic risk. The key takeaway here is that systematic tail risk factor is priced in 
hedge funds (i.e., has a premium attached to it) but idiosyncratic tail risk is not rewarded by the 
market.  
I begin my analysis by examining the relationship between fund R2 and tail risk for all 
equity oriented hedge funds in my sample. The starting point of my analysis is fund R2 values 
calculated using the same methodology and factor set as used by T-T. Based on the stepwise 
regression results, I then choose a candidate factor (MSCI EAFE index) for tail risk calculation 
based on high significance level (highest proportion of T-Stats greater than 2.33 when compared 
to other factors) and hit rate (selected 28% of the time in the stepwise regression). I then calculate 
tail risk for this factor based on the methodology prescribed by Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert 
(2016).  
I perform univariate sort on fund R2 and tail risk to show that low R2 funds have 
significantly higher tail risk than high R2 funds. This result provides evidence that the factor model 
used to calculate fund R2 is not able to capture this new kind of risk. While the stepwise model is 
able to capture the linear dependence between hedge fund returns and the factor returns but it is 
not able to capture the left tail correlation that is reflected in the tail risk factor.  
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Next I show that aggregated fund performance has a negative relationship to fund R2. I 
confirm the findings from T-T that low R2 funds have a higher performance (12-month forward 
looking alpha) than high R2 funds. The Q1-Q5 performance spread between low and high R-
squared funds is 6.78% annually and it is statistically significant at 1% confidence interval. This 
finding is consistent with the academic literature, which shows that low R2 funds outperform high 
R2 funds and this out-performance persists over time.  
Next I examine the cross sectional determinants of fund R-squareds (model specification 
based on T-T) to show that after controlling for size, log(age), lockup, number of non-linear factors 
selected in the stepwise regression, and residual kurtosis,  tail risk has a negative and significant 
predictive effect on fund R2. Moreover, the multivariate regression also confirm that tail risk is a 
significant predictor of fund R-squareds even after controlling for additional fund characteristics 
such as management and incentive fees, minimum investment, redemption period, notice period 
and indicator variables for leverage, high watermark, offshore domicile and hurdle rate as well as 
univariate risk measures like residual skewness. The adjusted R2 increases from 17.3% (T-T 
specification) to 20% (augmented specification that includes tail risk and additional fund 
characteristics), an improvement of 15.6%. 
In addition to skewness and kurtosis, there is a possibility that funds that have high tail risk 
may also exhibit high positive returns (fat right tails). I include max return (maximum returns over 
the past 24 months) as an independent variable, based on Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2015) to 
account for the possibility that right tail can also explain the effect of tail risk on fund R-squareds. 
I find that both max return and tail risk are significant predictors of fund R-squareds but they don’t 
interact with each other. While maximum return is positively related to fund R-squareds, tail risk 
has a negative exposure to fund R-squareds. Separately I also confirm that max return is not 
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correlated with tail risk (correlation is 0.0008). The adjusted R2 after including max returns 
remained same (20.08%).   
Next I show that by including a tail risk factor (return of a portfolio that is long funds that 
have high tail risk and short funds that have low tail risk) in the step wise regression, I can improve 
the fund R-squareds values across all five quintiles (on an average by 2.66% for the whole sample).  
When I do a conditional sort on previously estimated fund R-squareds without tail risk, I find that 
largest increase is for low R2 funds (quintile 1) which goes up by 12.3% , followed by Q2 (up by 
4.9%), Q3 (up by 2.52%), Q4 (up by 1.01%) and Q5 (flat).  The funds that had low R-square values 
previously (average R2 of 17.76%), now have an average R-square of 19.94%. The spread in Q5-
Q1 R2 values decreases by 2.3% and is statistically significant. I also show that on an average 6.2% 
of the low R2 funds are no longer low R2 when systematic tail risk factor is included in the step 
wise regression.  
Finally I examine whether systematic tail risk factor can explain time-series variation in 
fund performance. I show that spreads in future performance (Q1-Q5) of low and high R2 funds 
narrows from 6.78% to 6.21% after accounting for the systematic tail risk factor. Also 90% of the 
decrease in performance spread is primarily driven by drop in performance of low R2 (Q1) funds.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, I show that systematic tail 
risk can partially explain the phenomenon of low R2 hedge funds. I show that low R2 funds have 
high systematic tail risk than high R2 funds. I also provide evidence that hedge fund Q1-Q5 
performance spread is probably upwardly biased in the absence of systematic tail risk factor.  
Second, my paper adds to the extant literature on fund R2 and performance. More 
specifically, I shed some light on the notion of “low correlation or R2 can be attributed to manager 
skill”. According to T-T, hedge funds that are better informed are more likely to take less 
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systematic risk. The authors suggest that less confident hedge fund managers generate abnormal 
returns by taking more exposure to systematic or priced factors while skilled managers take more 
active bet in their portfolios (higher idiosyncratic risk). Sun et al. (2012) argue that funds that have 
low correlation to other funds in the same category/style generate higher risk adjusted returns and 
are better informed. My results provide evidence that superior performance of low R2 funds may 
not be entirely attributable to higher managerial skill, and that systematic tail risk of such funds 
can partially explain why they perform well. 
My findings have important implications for institutional investors that invest in hedge 
funds. Investors need to understand the different strategies employed by hedge funds and 
accordingly tailor the factor model they use to calculate fund R2 (one size does not fit all).  They 
need to augment their risk factor set with equity systematic tail risk (or other relevant factors) in 
order to identify funds that have low R2. Investors can also use this framework to identify what 
type of systematic tail risk they are exposed to across different asset classes such as fixed income, 
commodity, currency etc. and assess whether they are getting compensated to hold this additional 
source of risk. Investors that hold low R2 funds in their portfolios cannot ignore tail risk in their 
portfolio construction framework because it can lead to significant losses during periods of market 
shocks. Also in periods of high market uncertainty, investors can identify funds that have high 
systematic tail risk, and can put in hedges to control portfolio drawdowns.  
I.1 Hypothesis Development 
I develop and test two hypotheses based on my research questions.  
Hypothesis I: Risk - Low R2 funds have higher systematic tail risk exposure than high R2 funds 
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According to Bollen (2013), “Developing a complete set may be a Sisyphean task, 
especially if the missing factor represents catastrophic losses during rare events, which by nature 
will be difﬁcult to capture given the well-known data limitations of hedge funds.” 
Hedge funds can be exposed to tail risk when they follow dynamic trading strategies that 
have a non-linear relationship with the broader market (Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001, 2004; 
Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; Agarwal and Naik, 2004). Tail risk can be difficult to diversify as per 
Brown and Spitzer (2006) and Brown, and Gregoriou, and Pascalau (2012). This dependence on 
dynamic trading strategies makes it difficult for factor models to capture the time-series variation 
(non-linear dependence) of hedge fund returns. Moreover with explosive growth in in the hedge 
fund industry, fund managers are constantly trying to come with new investment ideas and are 
keen to differentiate2 themselves from other hedge funds. This leads to concentrated portfolios3 
and higher exposure to non-linear risks that are orthogonal to the standard hedge fund factors. This 
may increase their exposure to large negative shocks in the overall market. In such cases the fund 
managers are exposing themselves to higher systematic tail risk and this orthogonal risk can be 
captured by the systematic tail risk factor.  
 
 
                                                 
2 SEI Report: Observed Marsha Roth, senior managing director with Angelo, Gordon & Co., “Differentiation is 
critically important for managers in order to get institutional investors to understand the value your fund brings to 
their portfolio. While differentiation is a simple concept, it is difficult to accomplish because of the proliferation of 
funds. It is important to educate investors about what you do and how you do it, and a key part of that differentiation 
is the team.” Source:http://www.seic.com/docs/IMS/SEI-HF-Paper-6-Ways-to-Adapt_US.pdf?cmpid=im-hf-fine-13. 
3 Goldman Sachs report: "Hedge fund portfolio density remains near record highs. Hedge fund returns continue to 
depend on the performance of a few key stocks. The typical hedge fund has 69% of its long-equity assets invested in 
its 10 largest positions. This statistic compares with 33% for the typical large-cap mutual fund, 22% for the average 
small-cap mutual fund, 18% for the S&P 500 and just 2% for the Russell 2000 Index." Source: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/hedge-fund-manager-turnover-and-concentration-2016-8 
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Hypothesis II: Performance - By including tail risk, the gap in the performance of low R2 and high 
R2 funds narrows 
According to Bollen (2013), an omitted risk factor can create an upward biased estimate of 
hedge fund performance. By accounting for the premium associated with the tail risk factor, the 
risk adjusted return spread between low and high R2 funds is expected to narrow. Agarwal, Ruenzi, 
and Weigert (2016) shows that the tail risk factor explains cross-sectional variation in hedge fund 
returns even after controlling for other risks such as correlation risk (Buraschi, Kosowski, and 
Trojani, 2014), liquidity risk (Aragon, 2007; Sadka, 2010; Teo, 2011), macroeconomic uncertainty 
(Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2014), volatility risk (Bondarenko, 2004; Agarwal, Bakshi, and Huij, 
2009), and rare disaster concerns (Gao, Gao, and Song, 2014).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data sources and variable 
construction.  Section 2 investigates the relationship between R2 and tail risk Section 3 studies the 
impact of tail risk factor on fund performance. Section 5 provides context behind my findings and 
results. Section 6 concludes.  
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II DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION  
II.1 Data Sources 
Data on individual hedge funds is obtained from a “union database” which is constructed by 
combining four commercial hedge fund databases: Eurekahedge, HFR, Lipper TASS, and 
Morningstar. The union database contains assets under management, net-of fee returns, and hedge 
fund characteristics such as lockup, notice period, management and incentive fees, redemption 
period, minimum investment amount, inception dates, hurdle rate, offshore domicile and fund 
strategies. The advantage of combining four databases is that it can correct for inconsistencies 
among the different databases and it forms a representative sample of the whole hedge fund 
industry.  
Potential Biases in Hedge Fund Data:  
The start date of my sample is 1994, the year in which commercial databases started to include 
failed funds, so there is no survivorship bias in my sample. Backfill bias can arise when fund 
managers self -report back-tested or past histories when they join a commercial database. Most 
often fund managers’ report back filled history if they had superior performance during the early 
history of the fund. This can bias the early return history of the funds in the database (generally an 
upward bias). Despite the bias, I don’t exclude early return history of each fund because I am 
interested in the time-series variation in hedge fund returns and how factors models can capture 
this dynamics. This approach is consistent with the methodology followed by Bollen (2013). 
Hedge fund databases also suffer from smoothening as in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), 
misreporting as in Cassar and Gerakos (2011) and are subject to censoring Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang 
(2013). But problem of return smoothening is less severe in US equity hedge funds as pointed out 
by Bollen and Pool (2009).  My sample is restricted to only equity oriented hedge funds that are 
denoted in US dollars, and I do not correct for return smoothening.  
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I only select equity-oriented funds in my sample. The selected fund strategies include ‘Emerging 
Markets’, ‘Event Driven’, ‘Equity  Long-Short’, ‘Equity Long Only’, ‘Equity Market Neutral’, 
‘Short Bias’ or ‘Sector’. I also make sure that funds in my sample have at least 24 monthly return 
observations. I exclude funds that report in currencies other than US dollars. Finally I end up with 
7,561 equity-oriented funds in my sample from January 1996 to December 2013. I report summary 
statistics of hedge funds’ characteristics and excess returns (returns minus risk free rate) by fund 
strategy in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 here 
The mean monthly excess return in my sample is 0.57% and it ranges from 0.75% (Long Only) to 
-0.24% (Short Bias). The mean AUM is about $160 million and it ranges from $286 million (Event 
Driven) to $37.2 million (Short Bias).  
II.2 Variable Construction 
Risk Factors: 
I take the set of factors from T-T to run 24 month rolling window step wise regressions to 
produce estimates of fund R2 and alpha (the regression intercept).  The factors can be broadly 
classified as follows:  
Domestic Equity Factors: The goal here is to capture variation in US equity returns. This 
includes the Russell 3000, NASDAQ and NAREIT indices, Fama and French (1993) size (SMB) 
and value (HML) factors and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum (UMD) factor.  
International Equity Factors: This includes DAX, CAC 40, FTSE 100 Indices, the NIKKEI 
225, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Index EAFE, and the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International Emerging Markets (MSCI EMF) Index.  
Domestic Fixed Income factors: This includes Salomon Brothers ﬁve-year Index of 
Treasuries, Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, Ibbotson Associates default spread (DEF) and 
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duration spread (TERM), Barclays Aggregate of Mortgage-Backed Securities, and Barclays Index 
of ten-year maturity municipal bonds.  
International Fixed Income/Foreign Exchange factors: This includes Salomon Brothers 
Non-US Unhedged Dollar Index (to measure the strength of the dollar) and Salomon Brothers 
Non-US Weighted Government Bonds Index with a ﬁve- to seven-year duration (intermediate).  
Commodity Factors: This includes oil (an average of three oil price indices), gold and 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index.  
Nonlinear factors: This includes Primitive Trend Following Strategies (PTFS) for bonds, 
stock, currencies, and commodities as in Fung and Hsieh (2001) and portfolios of in- and out-of-
the-money calls and puts on the S&P 500 Index from Agarwal and Naik (2004).  
As hedge fund strategies can change over time (they are dynamic), I include a large number 
of factors (both linear and non-linear) so that the stepwise regression model is able to capture 
variation in fund returns. Stepwise regression methodology to identify factors has been used by 
Liang (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2001), and Agarwal and Naik (2000, 2004). I use the forward 
selection method with probability of entry and exit that closely follows T-T methodology which 
“selects a parsimonious set of explanatory factors by adding factors sequentially based on their F 
-test signiﬁcance, allows the data to select the set of factors for each fund that best explains that 
fund’s returns.” 
I estimate various multifactor models specified as 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑘
𝑇𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐹𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑇    , 𝑡 =  𝑡0 , … . , 𝑇                                    
 
Where is 𝑟𝑓 the risk-free rate, K is the number of factors selected by the stepwise algorithm and F 
represents the returns of factor portfolios. I aim to study the relationship between fund  𝛼 and the 
fund R-squareds generated from the above step wise regressions. 
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Performance measures:  
I calculate rolling 12 month forward alpha (performance) as specified in T-T.  
It is calculated from aggregating monthly alpha from time t+1 to t+13 to calculate 12 month 
forward alpha.  
I also calculate max return (trailing 24 month maximum returns) for all funds in my sample.  
Tail risk measure:  
I estimate tail risk for the MSCI EAFE Index using the methodology used by Agarwal, 
Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016), on a rolling 24 month window. For every fund and every trailing 24 
month period, the two worst returns of the index and fund are calculated. 4 Then tail sensitivity 
measure is calculated as 1 (if both worst returns of the fund and the index coincide), 0.5 (only one 
of the worst returns coincide) or 0 (none of the worst returns coincide). Tail risk is then calculated 
as the product of tail sensitivity and ratio of the expected shortfall (average of two worst returns) 
of the fund and index.  
Tail risk factor return:  
I estimate the tail risk factor return by creating a monthly portfolio that goes long funds 
that have high tail risk and short funds that have low tail risk. The return of this portfolio is the 
proxy for the tail risk factor. This follows the same methodology Fama and French (1993) size 
(SMB) and value (HML) factors.  
II.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of R-square measure, annualized alpha and number 
of factors selected from the stepwise regressions.   
 
                                                 
4 Expected shortfall at 5% confidence interval amounts to 1.2 months which is approximated to two months 
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Insert Table 2 here 
The mean Adj. R2 for the whole sample is 58% while for Market Neutral funds that hedge 
out market risk, the mean Adj. R2 is much lower around 44%. The mean annualized alpha in my 
sample is 2.2%.  The median number of factors selected in the stepwise regression model is 3, and 
it rarely goes higher than 4 or 5. The main reason behind low number of factors is that the stepwise 
regression model doesn’t allow large number of factors because of the cross-correlation between 
the independent risk factors. Also hedge funds hold concentrated portfolios, hence can only have 
exposure to a few risk factors. This observation is supported by Bollen (2013), who shows that 
funds with concentrated portfolios are more likely to have concentrated factor exposures. He 
reports that for low R2 funds, the most important factor accounts for 89% of the explained variation 
in fund returns compared to 83% for high R2 funds. These results are consistent with T-T who 
estimates the mean Adj. R2 and median number of factors from stepwise regressions to be 54% 
and 3 respectively.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the top five factors selected in the step wise 
regression.  
Insert Table 3 here 
MSCI EAFE and the Russell 3000 index are the top two factors selected in the step wise 
regression. MSCI EAFE is slightly ahead since it has higher hit rate than Russell 3000 (28% vs. 
27%) and it is also significant the most number of times (both at 1% and 5% confidence level). 
The other top factors are Fama and French (1993) size (SMB) and value (HML) factors and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum (UMD) factor. Based on the significance level and hit 
rate, I select MSCI EAFE as the candidate factor for estimating tail risk. The reason being if 
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most funds have linear exposure to this factor, it is likely that they may be exposed to the left tail 
of this factor.  
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III RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN R-SQUARE AND TAIL RISK  
I begin my analysis by conducting tests to analyze the relation between R-square and Tail 
risk.  
III.1 Univariate Sort: R-square and Tail risk 
In Table 4, I sort systematic tail risk on the fund R-square quintiles to understand the 
univariate relationship between them. 
Insert Table 4 
Consistent with my hypothesis I find that low R-square funds have higher tail risk than 
high R-square funds. Q1 R-square funds have the highest exposure to tail risk (3.93) and Q5 R-
square funds have the lowest exposure to tail risk (0.52). The Q1-Q5 spread of 3.41 is statistically 
significant at 1% confidence interval.  
Next I look at fund characteristics, other information such prime brokers etc. and style 
concentration of low R-square funds. The goal here is to understand why low R-square funds have 
more tail risk and are there any fund features that may point us to the reason behind their higher 
systematic tail risk.  
Table 5 reports the fund characteristics for low R-square, high R-square and all funds in 
my sample. It also reports the Q1-Q5 spread and associated significance levels.  
Insert Table 5 
Univariate analysis of fund characteristics show that low R-square funds are on a relative 
basis smaller in size and younger than high R-square funds. These low R-square funds also charge 
higher fees (both management and incentive fees), employ more leverage, and have high lockup 
period, water mark, minimum investment levels and notice period. These results are consistent 
with the skill interpretation that low R-square funds are managed by skilled managers that are able 
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to charge higher fees and negotiate better terms (higher lockup and notice period) with investors. 
Moreover low R-square funds have higher residual skewness and kurtosis. And the number of non-
linear factors selected in the step wise regression for low R-square funds is lower than that of high 
R-square funds (this finding is consistent with T-T).  
Table 6 reports information on prime brokers, auditors and fund administrators for both 
low and high R-square funds. It is not clear from the table if there are any significant differences 
between the two groups (low and high R-square funds) with regards to which prime brokers, 
auditors and administrators they use.  
Insert Table 6 
Table 7 reports the style concentration of low and high R-square funds and their associated 
tail risk.  
Insert Table 7 
It is interesting to note that low R-square funds have higher proportion of Event Driven, 
Market Neutral and Emerging Market strategy funds when compared to high R-square funds. This 
is intuitive because we know on an average Market Neutral funds are hedged and will have low 
R2 compared to other funds. Also on relative basis Event Driven and Emerging Market funds have 
lower R2, while Long Only and Short Bias have higher R2. Moreover I find that low R2 funds have 
higher tail risk across all strategies than high R2 funds. This result is consistent with my Risk 
hypothesis.  
III.2 Determinants of R-square 
Table 8 represents the cross sectional determinants of R-square. 
Insert Table 8 
I estimate five different models as designated in table 5. Model 1 closely follows the  
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T-T specification where the independent variables are log (AUM), log (Age), lockup 
(includes lockup and redemption period), number of non-linear factors and kurtosis of residual 
from the stepwise regression. I cluster standard error by fund and time and include strategy 
dummies in the regression. I find no significant relationship between R-Square and size which 
confirms T-T. Also lockup has no linkage to R-square which is similar to T-T’s findings. I include 
number of nonlinear factors in the regression to test whether hedge funds that take exposure to 
standard nonlinear factors have low R-square. Ingersoll, Spiegel, Goetzmann, and Welch (2007) 
find that some funds may try to game the system and implement nonlinear strategies to skew their 
performance. This can result in an artificial negative relationship with R-square and performance. 
Consistent with T-T, I find that number of nonlinear factors has a significant positive relationship 
with R-square. This finding suggests that funds that employ nonlinear strategies tend to have 
higher R-square, so they cannot game the system. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 17.2% which 
is similar to what T-T reported (15.42%).  
But contrary to T-T, I find that R-square is positively related to log (Age). This is intuitive 
because with age, funds grow more mature take less risks, stick to common investment themes and 
start to gather assets using their existing track record rather than focus on performance.  
Also residual kurtosis has a significant negative exposure to R-Square meaning funds 
whose returns have fat tails (leptokurtic) are likely to have low R-Square.  
Model 2 adds the tail risk factor as an additional independent variable. I find that tail risk 
is negatively related R-square which is consistent with my hypothesis and confirms the result from 
the univariate sort. The adjusted R2 didn’t change significantly from the previous specification.  
Model 3 includes residual kurtosis, other fund characteristics such as management fee, 
incentive fee, notice period, minimum investments ($100,000) and indicator variables for leverage, 
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high water mark, and offshore domicile. When taken together (tail risk and additional fund 
characteristics), the adjusted R2 increases to 20% (an improvement of 15.6% over T-T 
specification). I find that residual skewness is negatively related to R-square. When I consider 
negative exposures for both residual skewness and kurtosis, I think the more the fund returns 
deviate from a normal distribution (fat tails and skewed distribution), it is more likely that R-square 
of the fund will be lower. I also find that incentive fee is negatively related to R-square which 
means low R-square funds charge higher fees than high R2 funds. This result is consistent with T-
T. The exposure for offshore domicile funds is also negative and significant at 1% confidence 
interval. Offshore is an indicator variable that is zero for funds located in the US and 1 for funds 
located outside the US. This means that offshore funds tend to have lower R-square (higher 
managerial skill) than onshore funds. This contradicts Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Brown (1995) 
who don’t find any difference in managerial skill between offshore and onshore funds.  
In Model 4, I add one more independent variable, max returns which is 24 month trailing 
maximum returns as in Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2015). According to Bali et al (2015), max 
return is a strong predictor of future returns even after controlling for fund characteristics and 
alternates measures of risk and performance. A potential concern is that funds that have fat right 
tails (max returns) may also influence fund R-square and I want to confirm that tail risk factor is 
still significant even after controlling for max returns. I find that both max return and tail risk are 
significant predictors of fund R-squareds but they don’t interact with each other. While max return 
is positively related to fund R-squareds (which is a bit puzzling), tail risk has a negative exposure 
to fund R-squareds. Separately I also confirm that max return is not correlated with tail risk 
(correlations is 0.0008). Also I find that size is now related to fund R-square (significant at 1% 
level) which contradicts T-T. This means that larger hedge funds manage more diversified 
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portfolios and as a consequence have higher R-square values. I think max returns and size may be 
interacting in a way that is making size more significant. The adjusted R2 after including max 
returns remained same (20.09%).   
According to Bali et al (2015) hedge funds have non-normal distribution of returns because 
they employ dynamic strategies that have nonlinear payoffs. Max return is trying to capture this 
nonlinear behavior in the right tail of hedge fund return distribution. So max returns may interact 
with some of the factors in the regression such as number of nonlinear factors, residual kurtosis 
and residual skewness. Also it is not clear how it interacts with size and it may have an effect on 
log (age) also since age and size are correlated.  So in order to understand the interaction between 
tail risk and max returns, I run a simple model with just those two factors and the hedge fund 
characteristics (model 5). I find that tail risk is still significant and has a negative relationship with 
fund R-Square but max return is not related to fund R-square.  
In summary I show that tail risk has a consistent significant negative exposure to R-square 
across all the different model specifications. It is a unique risk measure that influences fund R-
square even after controlling for log (Age), size, and number of nonlinear factors, residual kurtosis, 
residual skewness, max returns and hedge fund characteristics. These results strongly support my 
first hypothesis Risk.  
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IV RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN R-SQUARE AND PERFORMANCE 
I begin my analysis by conducting tests to analyze the relation between fund R-square and 
Performance (12 month forward looking alpha).  
IV.1 Univariate Sort: R-square and Performance 
In Table 6, I sort performance (12 month forward alpha) on the fund R-square quintiles to 
understand the univariate relationship between them.  
Insert Table 9 
I find that low R-square funds have higher performance (12 month forward alpha) than 
high R-square funds. The Q1-Q5 performance spread is 6.78% and it is statistically significant at 
1% confidence level. These results are consistent with T-T who find that for Long-Short Equity 
funds the 12 month alpha spread (equally weighted) between low and high R-square funds is 7%.  
IV.2 Conditional Sort: R-square and Re-estimated R-Square 
Next I re-estimate the step wise regressions and include the tail risk factor as one of the 
candidate factors to choose from. Table 10 shows the re-estimated R-square values conditioned on 
the previously estimated fund R-square (without tail risk) quintiles.  
Insert Table 10 
I see an improvement in the fund R-squareds values across all five quintiles (on an average 
by 2.66% for the whole sample).  Also the largest increase is for low R2 funds (quintile 1) which 
goes up by 12.3%, followed by Q2 (up by 4.91%), Q3 (up by 2.52%), Q4 (up by 1.01%) and Q5 
(flat).  The funds that had low R2 values previously (17.8%), now have an average R-square of 
19.94%. Also the spread in Q5-Q1 R2 values decrease from 71.63% to 69.35% and is statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. 
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So what percent of low R-square funds are no longer low R-square when systematic tail 
risk is taken into account? Table 11 reports the transition rates for low R-square funds.  
Insert Table 11 
Table 11 shows that about 6.2% of low R-square funds move to higher R-square quintiles 
after systematic tail risk is included in the step wise regression. 4.3% of low R-square funds move 
to quintile 2, 1.4% move to quintile 3, 0.4% move to quintile 4 and 0.1% move to quintile 5.  
Finally I examine whether tail risk factor can explain time-series variation in fund 
performance. Table 12 shows re-estimated alpha values conditioned on the previously estimated 
fund R-square (without systematic tail risk) quintiles. I show that the spreads in future performance 
of low and high R2 funds narrows from 6.78% to 6.21% after accounting for the systematic tail 
risk factor.   
Insert Table 12 
This is consistent with my Performance hypothesis and suggests that after taking into 
account the premium associated with the tail risk factor, the Q1-Q5 alpha spread between low and 
high R-square funds narrow down. Further the decrease in Q1-Q5 performance spread of 57bps is 
primarily driven by drop in performance of the Q1 alpha (51bps).  
Table 12 also reports the systematic tail risk exposure for the different quintiles and 
significance levels of the exposures.  
It makes sense that the tail risk factor exposure is positive for Q1 which explains why the 
alpha for Q1 went down. But alpha for Q2-Q5 went up and exposure to tail risk factor for these 
quintiles are negative. This is a counterintuitive result. Let’s try to understand why this is the case. 
First, when I include tail risk factor in the stepwise regression, the new set of fund regressions are 
estimated from scratch hence the exposures for tail risk factor depends on how the tail risk factor 
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is correlated with other risk factors in the regression. Second, not all funds have tail risk to begin 
with (this holds true for funds across all quintiles of R-square but more so for funds in Q2-Q5), so 
the distribution of tail risk across funds is asymmetric and this can play a role on the loadings of 
the long short tail risk factor for Q2-Q5 funds. Third, the negative exposure for Q2-Q5 can be 
partly explained by how the tail risk factor is constructed.  It is the return of long short portfolio 
(rebalanced monthly) that is constructed by going long fund that have high tail risk and short funds 
that have low tail risk. I follow the same factor construction methodology as Fama and French 
(1993) use for constructing size (SMB) and value (HML) factors. Finally, one can argue that this 
result is similar to low value (quintile 5) stocks having negative slope to value factor (HML)5. It 
ties in with Table 4 and Exhibit 10.1, which shows that Q1 (low R-square funds) have the highest 
tail risk. Quintiles Q2-Q5 have low tail risk and they are not statistically different from each other 
(the distribution of tail risk across the different quintiles in asymmetric). So quintiles Q2-Q5 that 
have low tail risk have negative exposure to the tail risk factor.  
Insert Exhibit 1 
In summary, I show that after taking tail risk into account R-Square of funds increase across 
the board (low R2 funds show highest increase) and Q1-Q5 performance spread goes down. These 
results strongly support my second hypothesis Performance.  
 
  
                                                 
5 Fama and French, 1993 
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V DISCUSSION 
In this paper, I accomplish two objectives. First, I show that low R2 funds have higher 
systematic tail risk than high R2 funds. Second, I provide evidence that the performance spread 
between low and high R2 funds narrows when systematic tail risk is taken into consideration.  
Academic literature argues that the level of active management in a fund can have a 
positive effect on fund performance.6 Studies have shown that higher idiosyncrasy (low R2) in 
hedge fund returns signify higher managerial skill and activity.7 I show that 6.2% of low R2 funds 
are no longer low R2 when you include systematic tail risk. This suggests that the definition of low 
R2 funds (and how that relates to managerial skill) can change in case there is an omitted factor in 
the factor model used to calculate R2 values. Also, low R2 is not a necessary condition for high 
managerial skill or performance but it has been shown in the literature that there is a strong relation 
between the two.  
I show that the performance spread between low and high R2 funds can be upwardly biased 
when there is an omitted factor such as the systematic tail risk. So the outperformance of low R2 
funds (evidence of managerial skill) can be partially explained by systematic tail risk. The 
performance spread narrows from 6.78% to 6.21%, a decrease of 57bps by including systematic 
tail risk. More importantly 90% of the decrease in future performance is driven by low R2 funds.  
Even after accounting for tail risk, the performance gap between low and high R2 funds 
continues to be high. Bollen (2013) shows that portfolios constructed from zero R2 funds have half 
the volatility of other funds (that have high R2). He suggests that there may be one or more omitted 
factors that is driving the volatility of zero R2 funds. So there can be other kinds of risks such as 
                                                 
6 Brands, Brown, and Gallagher, 2006; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005); Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; and 
Cremers et al.,2011. 
7 Titman and Tiu, 2011; Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012; Amihud and Goyenko, 2013. 
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operational risk, and other non-linear sources of risk in addition to systematic tail risk that a linear 
factor model is not able to capture. Alternatively, the performance gap may be a true measure of 
the ability and skill of the hedge fund manager to generate abnormal returns.  
Continuing on the theme of volatility of low R2 funds, next I discuss the implications of 
standard portfolio diversification such as mean-variance framework within the context of investing 
in low R2 funds which have high tail risk. Hedge funds that follow dynamic trading strategies have 
a nonlinear relation with the broader market.8 As a result such funds can be exposed to tail risk 
which can be difficult to diversify.9 Agarwal and Naik (2004) compare two portfolio construction 
methods, traditional mean-variance framework and mean-conditional value-at-risk10 (M-CVaR) 
framework to understand the extent of under-estimation of tail risk for mean-variance optimal 
portfolios. They find that underestimation of tail risk can range from 12% to 54% (for range of 
confidence levels from 90% and 99%) for mean-variance optimal portfolios. Moreover, this 
underestimation is more pronounced for low volatility portfolios which is the case for a portfolio 
of low R2 funds. This finding has important implications for investors that hold low R2 funds in 
their portfolios, since ignoring tail risk in their portfolio construction framework can lead to 
significant losses during periods of market shocks. 
Next I try to provide some intuition from the prior literature about the holdings of low R2 
hedge funds that can contribute towards high tail risk. Agarwal, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2016) 
analyze long equity and option positions from 13F filings of hedge funds to show that these 
positions in tail-sensitive stocks and put options can partially explain why these funds have high 
tail risk. They also find that higher leverage in funds can contribute to higher tail risk.  
                                                 
8 Fung and Hsieh, 1997, 2001, 2004; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; Agarwal and Naik, 2004. 
9 Brown and Spitzer, 2006; Brown, Gregoriou, and Pascalau, 2012. 
10 Mean-conditional Value-at-risk is same as Expected Shortfall which is used in calculating systematic tail risk. 
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V.1 Implications for Practice 
So how are these research findings relevant for a practitioner such as a fund of fund 
manager? It is clear that low R2 funds are doing something unique that sets them apart from other 
funds and they are able to deliver significant future performance.  
Funds that are low R2 cannot remain low R2 for the life of the fund. Through time low R2 
funds which are usually smaller in size and younger in age, gather more assets and become mature. 
This observation is consistent with my findings that show log (age) is positively related to fund 
R2. Along the way their investment strategy evolves from unique to more traditional investments 
and their R2 increases over time. So in order to generate superior abnormal returns, one has to keep 
investing in low R2 funds and incur high turnover which can be prohibitively costly. Given that 
standard lockup periods are about a year, one has to rebalance their portfolio of low R2 funds every 
year and that may not be feasible.  
Another related concern is persistence of performance. How can these low R2 funds keep 
generating high abnormal returns? Berk and Green (2004) show that for the mutual fund industry, 
skill of the fund manager is a scarce resource and as the fund increases in size (due to higher fund 
flows that follow past performance), its expected performance going forward goes down. In the 
equilibrium, investors continue to invest in the fund till the performance of the fund remains 
competitive in the marketplace. Thus they argue that performance cannot remain persistent over 
time. Glode and Green (2011) argue that hedge funds are different from mutual funds since they 
are private, don’t have to disclose information, and have less oversight than mutual funds or public 
companies. They link persistence in performance to secrecy (organizational form of hedge funds) 
in the sense that performance can attributed to unique strategies/techniques in addition to 
managerial skill.  
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Another concern is that investing in low R2 funds can be risky since they have high tail 
risk, as my study shows. Though low R2 funds tend have low volatility11, measures like standard 
deviation (second moment) of returns is not able to capture systematic tail risk which can be a 
function higher moments such as skewness and kurtosis. Also not all low R2 funds have tail risk, 
so there is some diversification effect that can be gained by combining a bunch of low R2 funds. 
As I noted earlier in this section, a portfolio construction method12 that takes into expected shortfall 
is more appropriate in this case.  
Based on my findings, here are my suggestions for a fund of fund manager that wants to 
construct a portfolio of low R2 funds with superior risk return profile.  
- Identify low R2 funds that have no or limited exposure to systematic tail risk. In my study 
I have only examined equity systematic tail risk but low R2 funds can have systematic tail 
risk to commodity, currency or fixed income factors also.  
- Use an appropriate portfolio construction methodology that takes into account tail risk such 
as mean-conditional value-at-risk framework rather than the mean-variance framework, 
and controls for excessive turnover and trading costs to create a fund of low R2 funds.  
- Use fund due diligence and qualitative information about the manager and the hedge fund 
strategy to complement the quantitative research to select the funds for investment. For 
instance low R2 funds may have higher operational risk that includes return misreporting 
among other attributes.  
To summarize, in this section, I provide some context behind my key findings and how 
that relates to extant literature. I discuss implications for portfolio diversification and provide some 
intuition on portfolio holdings of low R2 funds. I also provide suggestions for practitioners such as 
                                                 
11 Bollen, 2013 
12 Mean-conditional value-at-risk  (M-CVaR) framework (Agarwal and Naik, 2004) 
 28 
fund of fund managers as to how they can leverage my findings to construct more efficient fund 
of funds.   
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VI CONCLUSION 
I make two primary contributions in this paper. First I show that low R2 funds have higher 
equity systematic tail risk that is not accounted for in existing multi-factor models used to evaluate 
hedge funds. Second, I show that the spreads between the future performance of low and high R2 
funds narrows by about 9% after accounting for the systematic tail risk factor. These findings are 
consistent with my Risk and Performance hypotheses respectively. I also provide evidence that 
superior performance of low R2 funds may not be entirely attributable to higher managerial skill, 
and that systematic tail risk of such funds can partially explain why they perform well.  
My results are valuable both from an academic and fund due diligence viewpoint. It is 
possible that low R2 funds may have exposure to one or more omitted factors but if the fund analyst 
can tailor the factor model to the specific hedge fund strategy, then she will have a better chance 
of capturing a larger fraction of the variation in fund returns. My findings are important to investors 
that hold portfolio of low R2 funds and want to construct efficient portfolios to manage their tail 
risk exposures.  
There are a number of limitations of this study which may lead to further research. The 
systematic tail risk factor is constructed by going long hedge funds that have high tail risk and 
short funds that have low tail risk. It is not feasible to short hedge funds so constructing this factor 
from a piratical standpoint can be difficult. One can take only the long side of the tail risk factor 
to construct an investible risk factor and replicate the study. My study can be extended to non-
equity oriented hedge funds to understand the implications of systematic tail risk on fund R2 for 
multi-strategy, fund of funds, CTAs and macro hedge funds.  Moreover the T-T risk factors can 
be supplemented by other risk factors such as correlation risk13, liquidity risk14, macroeconomic 
                                                 
13  Buraschi, Kosowski, and Trojani, 2014 
14  Aragon, 2007; Sadka, 2010; Teo, 2011 
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uncertainty15, volatility risk16 and rare disaster concerns17 to make the factor set more robust and 
representative of all the different types of risk. The limitations of stepwise regression can be 
overcome with more sophisticated methods such as LASSO or Elastic-Net regression etc.  
  
                                                 
15 Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2014 
16 Bondarenko, 2004; Agarwal, Bakshi, and Huij, 2009 
17 Gao, Gao, and Song, 2014 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the AUM ($ mil), Age in months, excess returns (monthly), management fee, incentive 
fee, minimum investment ($100,000), lockup calculated as log (1+redemption/30+lockup/30) as in 
Titman and Tiu (2011), redemption period (days) and indicator variables leverage, high water mark and 
hurdle rate for all hedge funds in my sample from January 1996 to December 2013. 
 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
        
Event Driven AUM ($ mil) 286.26 743.16 25.2 72 210 37110 
 Age 88.37 59.99 42 70 118 43454 
 excess returns 0.50% 4.31% -0.61% 0.50% 1.75% 43452 
 mfee 1.48 0.47 1 1.5 2 42707 
 ifee 18.83 4.29 20 20 20 43283 
 mininv ($100,000) 14.27 21.36 5 10 10 42305 
 lockup 1.88 1.08 0.69 1.95 2.77 43454 
 offsh 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 43454 
 lev 0.56 0.50 0 1 1 32050 
 redem 125.67 120.40 30 90 90 41719 
 hwm 0.84 0.37 1 1 1 42314 
 hurdrate 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 43454 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
Emerging Markets AUM ($ mil) 132.77 342.98 14.68 39.95541 116 19194 
 Age 74.56 45.18 40 62 96 25821 
 excess returns 0.65% 7.74% -2.22% 0.59% 3.65% 25821 
 mfee 1.62 0.42 1.5 1.5 2 24489 
 ifee 17.67 5.15 15 20 20 24634 
 mininv ($100,000) 6.17 16.77 1 2 5 25008 
 lockup 0.95 0.94 0.21 0.69 1.39 25821 
 offsh 0.88 0.32 1 1 1 25821 
 lev 0.62 0.49 0 1 1 16968 
 redem 52.25 60.98 30 30 90 22574 
 hwm 0.70 0.46 0 1 1 23626 
 hurdrate 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 25821 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
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Long Only AUM ($ mil) 176.34 431.51 15.8 49.9555 162.25 15330 
 Age 80.86 49.38 42 67 108 21682 
 excess returns 0.75% 6.85% -1.67% 0.68% 3.29% 21682 
 mfee 1.40 0.45 1 1.5 1.75 20813 
 ifee 14.75 7.70 10 20 20 20993 
 mininv ($100,000) 40.61 406.78 1 1 10 19485 
 lockup 0.99 1.07 0.10 0.69 1.39 21682 
 offsh 0.75 0.43 1 1 1 21682 
 lev 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 3194 
 redem 52.74 69.60 30 30 90 19497 
 hwm 0.70 0.46 0 1 1 20417 
 hurdrate 0.38 0.49 0 0 1 21682 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
Long Short AUM ($ mil) 135.14 452.47 10.87 34.7 108.4 153190 
 Age 85.08 64.32 42 68 111 189373 
 excess returns 0.61% 21.30% -1.67% 0.49% 2.80% 189388 
 mfee 1.37 0.53 1 1.5 1.5 185130 
 ifee 18.39 5.28 20 20 20 185954 
 mininv ($100,000) 7.90 16.50 2 5 10 183728 
 lockup 1.53 1.10 0.69 1.39 2.77 189393 
 offsh 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 189393 
 lev 0.63 0.48 0 1 1 123177 
 redem 82.17 93.47 30 90 90 177837 
 hwm 0.83 0.37 1 1 1 184224 
 hurdrate 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 189393 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
Market Neutral AUM ($ mil) 172.27 438.51 10.13 39.69658 148 17445 
 Age 73.32 48.70 37 58 94 20579 
 excess returns 0.26% 3.75% -0.82% 0.24% 1.36% 20579 
 mfee 1.38 0.54 1 1.25 2 19859 
 ifee 18.04 6.25 20 20 20 19867 
 mininv ($100,000) 21.27 64.09 2.5 10 10 20251 
 lockup 1.13 0.94 0.69 0.69 1.39 20579 
 offsh 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 20579 
 lev 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 16392 
 redem 50.57 48.15 30 30 90 19063 
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 hwm 0.75 0.43 0 1 1 19944 
 hurdrate 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 20579 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
Short Bias AUM ($ mil) 37.18 48.49 7.465 20 49.55 2536 
 Age 84.77 51.04 44 73 113 3117 
 excess returns -0.24% 6.73% -3.27% -0.10% 2.68% 3116 
 mfee 1.31 0.50 1 1 1.5 2962 
 ifee 18.27 7.37 20 20 20 3072 
 mininv ($100,000) 6.92 12.84 2.5 5 10 3117 
 lockup 1.49 1.03 0.69 1.39 2.77 3117 
 offsh 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 3117 
 lev 0.56 0.50 0 1 1 2598 
 redem 78.34 66.68 30 90 90 2934 
 hwm 0.72 0.45 0 1 1 3117 
 hurdrate 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 3117 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
Sector AUM ($ mil) 120.40 258.67 10 29.14 100 8127 
 Age 70.55 50.26 36 54 88 8808 
 excess returns 0.44% 7.53% -2.26% 0.37% 3.12% 8807 
 mfee 1.40 0.43 1 1.5 1.75 8604 
 ifee 19.34 3.23 20 20 20 8707 
 mininv ($100,000) 10.59 20.82 2.5 10 10 8790 
 lockup 1.99 1.01 1.39 2.30 2.77 8808 
 offsh 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 8808 
 lev 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 8744 
 redem 104.91 111.06 30 90 90 8764 
 hwm 0.90 0.30 1 1 1 8808 
 hurdrate 0.00 0.02 0 0 0 8808 
Style Variable Mean Std. Dev 25% Median 75% N 
All Funds AUM ($ mil) 160.73 493.63 12.3 40 125.57 252932 
 Age 83.19 60.15 41 67 109 312834 
 excess returns 0.57% 16.98% -1.47% 0.48% 2.58% 312845 
 mfee 1.41 0.51 1 1.5 1.75 304564 
 ifee 18.15 5.48 20 20 20 306510 
 mininv ($100,000) 11.72 106.00 1.5 5 10 302684 
 lockup 1.48 1.10 0.69 1.39 2.77 312854 
 34 
 offsh 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 312854 
 lev 0.60 0.49 0 1 1 203123 
 redem 82.69 95.05 30 90 90 292388 
 hwm 0.81 0.39 1 1 1 302450 
 hurdrate 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 312854 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Factors Models – Stepwise Regressions 
This table reports the estimated R-Squareds, annualized alpha and number of factors selected in the step 
wise regression. The R-squareds are calculated from stepwise regressions using the entire history of each 
fund on a rolling 24 months window. Funds are divided by strategy type. The sample data used span from 
January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
Style Master Variable Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
       
Event Driven Adj R2 0.53 0.26 0.35 0.56 0.74 
 Alpha 0.03 0.34 -0.08 0.03 0.14 
 No. of Factors 2.66 1.65 1 2 4 
       
Emerging Markets Adj R2    0.58 0.24 0.43 0.63 0.78 
 Alpha 0.01 0.57 -0.24 0.00 0.23 
 No. of Factors 2.79 1.62 2 3 4 
       
Long Only Adj R2 0.61 0.26 0.43 0.67 0.83 
 Alpha    0.01 0.51 -0.17 0.01 0.18 
 No. of Factors 2.78 1.65 2 3 4 
       
Long Short Adj R2 0.60 0.25 0.44 0.65 0.81 
 Alpha 0.02 1.42 -0.15 0.01 0.18 
 No. of Factors    2.88 1.65 2 3 4 
       
Market Neutral Adj R2 0.44 0.26 0.24 0.44 0.63 
 Alpha 0.02 0.36 -0.08 0.02 0.13 
 No. of Factors 2.37 1.62 1 2 3 
       
Short Bias Adj R2 0.71 0.23 0.59 0.78 0.89 
 Alpha 0.01 0.41 -0.15 0.01 0.17 
 No. of Factors 3.09 1.62 2 3 4 
       
Sector Adj R2    0.60 0.26 0.44 0.67 0.81 
 Alpha 0.02 0.50 -0.19 0.01 0.21 
 No. of Factors 2.92 1.72 2 3 4 
       
All Funds Adj R2 0.58 0.26 0.40 0.63 0.79 
 Alpha    0.02 1.14 -0.14 0.01 0.17 
 No. of Factors 2.80 1.65 2 3 4 
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Table 3: Factor Model Exposure and T-Stat 
This table reports the summary statistics of the top five factors selected in the step wise regression. The  
sample data used span from January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
Variable 
# 
Selected 
Mean 
Exposure     
Hit 
Rate 
#T-
Stat>1.96 
# T-
Stat>2.33 
Mean T-
Stat 
MSCI 
EAFE 89,321 0.627 28% 85,420 79,596 4.80 
Russell 
3000 87,319 0.629 27% 84,106 79,287 5.65 
SMB 71,466 0.507 22% 64,573 54,455 3.58 
UMD 62,493 0.002 20% 55,906 44,607 3.48 
HML 59,617 -0.101 19% 53,599 44,607 3.49 
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Table 4: Univariate Portfolio Sort: R-Square and Tail Risk 
This table reports estimated tail risk based on 24 month rolling observations for different R-square 
quintiles estimated from step wise regression. The sample data used span from January 1994 to December 
2013. 
  
Portfolio   Adj. R2   Tail risk 
Hit 
Rate T-Stat of Tail risk Quintile Difference 
1(Lowest)  0.18  3.93 51.90%  
2  0.45  0.60 43.24% diff = mean(1) - mean(2)    t =   4.89*** 
3  0.62  0.64 35.68% diff = mean(2) - mean(3)    t =  -0.86 
4  0.76  0.52 28.57% diff = mean(3) - mean(4)    t =   1.09 
5(Highest)  0.89  0.52 17.70% diff = mean(4) - mean(5)    t =   -0.03 
             
1-5    3.41 35.52%  
    (5.83)***   
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Table 5: Univariate Analysis-Hedge Fund Characteristics 
This table reports fund characteristics for low R-square, high R-square and full sample of hedge funds. It 
also reports the Q1-Q5 values and the statistical significance of the difference. The sample data used span 
from January 1994 to December 2013. 
   
Variable Low R2 (Q1) High R2 (Q5) All Funds 1-5 T-Stat 
size 17.42 17.49 17.47 -0.07 -6.05*** 
Log(age) 4.10 4.38 4.22 -0.28 -81.18*** 
lockup 1.40 1.47 1.46 -0.07 -11.69*** 
No of nonlinear factors 0.27 0.99 0.64 -0.71 -170.00*** 
Residual kurtosis 3.27 3.05 3.07 0.22 25.54*** 
mfee 1.47 1.34 1.41 0.13 41.49*** 
ifee 18.51 16.71 17.97 1.80 51.39*** 
lev 0.61 0.56 0.59 0.04 12.02*** 
hwm 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.05 20.63*** 
offsh 0.58 0.46 0.53 0.12 43.57*** 
mininv 16.28 10.43 11.86 5.85 7.94*** 
Residual skewness 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.09 22.69*** 
Advanced Notice Days 40.46 36.11 39.03 4.34 24.40*** 
 
Note:                                 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 6: Other Information: Prime Broker, Auditor and Administrator 
This table reports the top six Prime Brokers, Auditors and Fund Administrators and % market share for 
low R2 funds and how that compares with high R2 funds. The sample data used span from January 1994 to 
December 2013. 
  
    Low R2 High R2 
    
Prime Broker Morgan Stanley (9.34%) Morgan Stanley (10.27%) 
  Goldman Sachs (7.26%) Goldman Sachs (7.19%) 
  Goldman Sachs & Co (4.83%) JP Morgan (3.67%) 
  JP Morgan (3.22%) UBS (3.55%) 
  
Bear Stearns Asset Management Inc 
(3%) 
Bear Stearns Asset Management 
Inc (2.7%) 
  UBS (2.57%) Goldman Sachs & Co (2.69%) 
    
Auditor  PricewaterhouseCoopers (10.83%) Ernst & Young (8.55%) 
  Ernst & Young (8.12%) PricewaterhouseCoopers (8.34%) 
  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Isle of Man) 
(6.8%) KPMG (7.5%) 
  KPMG (6.32%) 
Ernst & Young Accountants 
(4.35%) 
  Ernst & Young Accountants (5.51%) Deloitte (4.09%) 
  KPMG (Cape Town) (4.31%) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (Isle of 
Man) (3.11%) 
    
Administrator CITCO (2.97%) CITCO (3.3%) 
  Citco Fund Services (2.33%) Northern Trust (1.76%) 
  HSBC (1.81%) UBS (1.66%) 
  Goldman Sachs (1.43%) Citco Fund Services (1.54%) 
  Citi (1.36%) 
Morgan Stanley Fund Services 
USA LLC (1.43%) 
  HSBC (Hong Kong) (1.31%) HSBC (1.37%) 
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Table 7: Low R-Square Funds: Style Concentration 
This table reports the style concentration for low R2 funds and tail risk for each of the hedge fund styles. 
The sample data used span from January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
Style Q1 - Style % Q1 -Tail Risk Q5 – Style % Q5-Tail Risk 
Event Driven 17.2% 3.44 9.4% 0.40 
Emerging Market 7.4% 4.10 6.9% 0.81 
Long Only 6.4% 6.47 9.0% 0.61 
Long Short 53.5% 4.27 67.4% 0.52 
Market Neutral 12.6% 1.85 2.3% 0.31 
Short Bias 0.4% 0.39 2.0% 0.05 
Sector 2.5% 4.63 3.1% 0.60 
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Table 8: Determinants of R-Square 
This table reports regression coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions. In Model 1, I regress 
R-squareds on the following fund characteristics: log (AUM), which is the natural logarithm of the size of 
the fund, US$; log (Age), which is the length of time the fund has existed in the sample; Lockup is the 
lockup period for a fund combined with the redemption notice period. I use number of nonlinear factors 
and kurtosis of residual as independent variables. I also include tail risk, hedge fund characteristics and 
max return (trailing 24 month maximum returns) in Models 2, 3 and 4 respectively in that order. Model 5 
has excluded size, log (Age), nonlinear factors, kurtosis and skewness from model 4 to examine how tail 
risk and max return explain fund R-square. The sample data used span from January 1994 to December 
2013. 
     
Clustered standard error by fund and time    
 Mode1 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Tail Risk   -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
    [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Size -0.002 -0.002 0.255 0.461***                 
  [0.14] [0.14] [0.17] [0.17]                 
Log(age) 7.095*** 7.089*** 6.197*** 6.373***                 
  [0.37] [0.37] [0.47] [0.47]                 
lockup 0.281 0.28 0.837** 0.737** 1.047*** 
  [0.24] [0.24] [0.36] [0.36] [0.35] 
No of nonlinear factors 10.477*** 10.477*** 10.794*** 10.826***                 
  [0.16] [0.16] [0.18] [0.18]                 
kurtosis of residual -1.594*** -1.590*** -1.552*** -1.730***                 
  [0.13] [0.13] [0.15] [0.16]                 
mfee     -1.16 -1.331 -2.141**  
      [0.82] [0.83] [0.97] 
ifee     -0.424*** -0.420*** -0.476*** 
      [0.08] [0.08] [0.07] 
lev     -0.354 -0.425 -0.157 
      [0.66] [0.66] [0.64] 
hwm     0.521 0.612 0.427 
      [0.86] [0.85] [0.81] 
offsh     -3.601*** -3.620*** -4.120*** 
      [0.70] [0.69] [0.70] 
mininv     -0.004 -0.005 0.007 
      [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
skewness of residual     -1.199*** -1.705***                 
      [0.30] [0.30]                 
Advanced Notice Days     -0.035*** -0.033** -0.039*** 
      [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Max return       26.043*** 0.157 
        [3.40] [0.53] 
constant 41.185*** 41.197*** 39.705*** 33.007*** 74.883*** 
  [3.62] [3.62] [4.67] [4.75] [3.59] 
Adj R-square 0.172 0.172 0.201 0.209 0.062 
Strategy dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 42 
Observations   252,274    252,274    163,996    163,996    195,670  
 
Note:                                 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 9: Univariate Portfolio Sort: R-Square and Alpha 
This table reports estimated 12 month forward alpha for different R-square quintiles estimated from  
step wise regression. The sample data used span from January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
 
Portfolio   Adj. R2   Alpha T-Stat of Alpha Quintile Difference 
1 (Lowest)  0.18  7.17%  
2  0.45  4.78% diff = mean(1) - mean(2)    t =   3.38*** 
3  0.62  2.31% diff = mean(2) - mean(3)    t =  4.50*** 
4  0.76  1.35% diff = mean(3) - mean(4)    t =   2.00** 
5(Highest)  0.89  0.39% diff = mean(4) - mean(5)    t =   2.04** 
            
1-5    6.78%  
    (10.02)***  
Note:                                 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 10: Conditional Sort – R-Square and Re-estimated R-Square 
This table reports the re-estimated adjusted R-square from the stepwise regression after including  
tail risk factor conditioned on previously estimated R-square quintiles. The sample data used span  
from January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
Portfolio   Adj. R2 
Re-estimated 
Adj. R2 
Abs Increase in Adj. 
R2 
% increase in Adj. 
R2 
1 (Lowest)  17.76% 19.94% 2.18% 12.29% 
2  45.10% 47.31% 2.21% 4.91% 
3  62.30% 63.87% 1.57% 2.52% 
4  76.03% 76.80% 0.77% 1.01% 
5(Highest)  89.39% 89.29% -0.10% -0.11% 
            
Average  58.11% 59.66% 1.55% 2.66% 
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Table 11: Low R2 Fund Transitions  
This table reports the proportion of low R2 funds (estimated from the stepwise regressions) that remain  
low R2 funds (estimated from stepwise regressions after taking into account systematic tail risk). The  
sample data used span from January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
Quintile % of Funds 
Q1 (old) -> Q1 (new) 93.8% 
Q1 (old) -> Q2 (new) 4.3% 
Q1 (old) -> Q3 (new) 1.4% 
Q1 (old) -> Q4 (new) 0.4% 
Q1 (old) -> Q5 (new) 0.1% 
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Table 12: Conditional Sort – R-Square and Re-estimated Alpha 
This table reports the re-estimated 12 month forward alpha from the stepwise regression after including tail risk factor  
conditioned on previously estimated R-square quintiles and compares it with previously estimated 12 month forward 
alpha values. The sample data used span from January 1994 to December 2013. 
 
Portfolio Alpha 
Re-estimated 
Alpha 
Decrease 
in Q1-Q5 
Alpha 
spread % Decrease 
Tail Risk Avg. 
Exposure 
Tail Risk 
Avg.  
T-Stat 
1 (Lowest) 7.17% 6.66%   0.096 4.46*** 
2 4.78% 5.54%   -0.028 4.09*** 
3 2.31% 2.51%   -0.076 4.56*** 
4 1.35% 3.04%   -0.086 4.75*** 
5(Highest) 0.39% 0.45%   -0.002 4.81*** 
                
1-5 6.78% 6.21% 0.57% 8.4%    
 (10.02)*** (6.47)***      
 
Note:                                 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix B Exhibits 
Exhibit 1. R-Square and Tail risk 
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